<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>EvilCode</title>
    <link>/</link>
    <description>Recent content on EvilCode</description>
    <generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 08:32:49 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Midnight Sun CTF 2023: HFSAntiCheat</title>
      <link>/posts/2023/msctf-2023-hfsanticheat/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 08:32:49 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>/posts/2023/msctf-2023-hfsanticheat/</guid>
      <description>HFS is getting into the anti-cheat biz! Submit game cheats to help us BETA test our anti-cheat engine. The flag is in C:\Windows\System32\flag.txt
HFSAntiCheat Intro HFSAntiCheat was an homage to the collection of vulnerable drivers at LOLdrivers. A common vulnerability for these drivers was arbitrary physical memory read-and-write. This could be due to copy-paste from WinIO.
The players were able to submit a &amp;ldquo;game cheat&amp;rdquo; as a custom Portable Executable (PE) file to a remote Windows system.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Midnight Sun CTF 2023: HFSHyperRAM</title>
      <link>/posts/2023/msctf-2023-hfshyperram/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 08:32:49 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>/posts/2023/msctf-2023-hfshyperram/</guid>
      <description>HFSHyperRAM provides anti-cheat features including secure storage within the hypervisor. To capture the flag, simply execute the &amp;lsquo;flag&amp;rsquo; command on the host operating system!
HFSHyperRam Intro HFSHyperRAM was an emulated device for VirtualBox that provided &amp;ldquo;secure&amp;rdquo; storage in the host Operating System (OS) of the challenge Virtual Machine (VM). This was part two of my previous HFSAntiCheat challenge. The players could submit a &amp;ldquo;game cheat&amp;rdquo; via a Portable Executable (PE) file.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>FreeBSD (CVE-2019-5602)</title>
      <link>/posts/2019/freebsd-2019/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 2019 20:49:03 +0100</pubDate>
      
      <guid>/posts/2019/freebsd-2019/</guid>
      <description>CVE-2019-5602 Analysis Source: https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153522/FreeBSD-Security-Advisory-FreeBSD-SA-19-11.cd_ioctl.html
In short, the CDIOCREADSUBCHANNEL_SYSSPACE ioctl was erroneously made accessible to userland. It&amp;rsquo;s reachable if a user is able to read the /dev/cd0, any user of the group operators can do this currently.
A requirement for this to work is that a media is inserted into the cd-device, however this might not be true when FreeBSD is virtualized f.ex. via VMWare.
The ioctl trusts the user-controlled input and writes &amp;ldquo;arbitrary&amp;rdquo; data to a kernel-address of the attackers choice.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>SEC-T 2019: Mirc2077</title>
      <link>/posts/2019/sect-2019-mirc2077/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Sep 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>/posts/2019/sect-2019-mirc2077/</guid>
      <description>Intro I made this challenge for the SEC-T CTF 2019. It has two parts and is meant to be a minimal &amp;lsquo;browser-pwnable&amp;rsquo;. The javascript engine used is Duktape (https://duktape.org). A custom bug was introduced to it which can be used to get code-execution in the JS-interpreter-process. This process is heavily sandboxed with Seccomp and the second part of the challenge is about escaping it by exploiting an IPC-bug in the main-process.</description>
    </item>
    
  </channel>
</rss>
